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Abstract 
The Great Recession has indicated that firms' leverage and access to finance are important for hiring 
and firing decisions. It is now empirically established that bank lending is correlated to employment 
losses when credit conditions deteriorate. We provide further evidence of this drawing on a new 
dataset that we assembled on employment adjustment and financial positions of European firms. Yet, 
in the Diamond Mortensen Pissarides (DMP) model there is no role for finance. All projects that 
display positive net present values are realized and financial markets are assumed to be perfect. What 
if financial markets are not perfect? Does a different access to finance influence the firm's hiring and 
firing decisions? The paper uses the concept of limited pledgeability proposed by Holmstrom and 
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disappear, so does the motive for firms to hold liquidity. This suggests a fundamental 
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1 Introduction
The 2008 financial crisis and the associated increase in unemployment on both sides of the Atlantic
sparked a new interest in the relationship between financial imperfections and labor market dynamics.
In the aftermath of the crisis, a growing empirical literature studied the links between financial
conditions and employment adjustment. The Great Recession has indicated that firms’ leverage
and firms’ access to finance are clearly correlated to hiring and firing decisions. More specifically, it
is now empirically accepted that frictions in bank lending are correlated to employment losses when
credit conditions deteriorate.1
The Diamond Mortensen Pissarides (DMP) model is the main paradigm for addressing imperfect
labor markets. In the baseline framework, there is no role for finance. All projects that display
positive net present values are realized and financial markets are assumed to be perfect. What if
financial markets are not perfect? Does a different access to finance influence the firm hiring and
firing decisions? These basic questions call for a deeper understanding of the relationship between
labor and finance. Among the financial frictions addressed by the literature and reviewed below,
this paper exploits the concept of limited pledgeability proposed by Holmstrom and Tirole (2011).
The idea is that only part of the entrepreneur’s income is pledgeable and can be borrowed upon,
either because part of the income is private benefit or because the entrepreneur needs incentives.
By adding financial imperfections and borrowing constraints into an otherwise standard equilibrium
unemployment model, the paper contributes to the building of an archetype and flexible model of
labor and finance.
In our model, firms are financially constrained by limited pledgeability, invest in physical capital,
and hire workers within an imperfect labor market. Entering firms attract workers by posting vacancies
with wages attached to them, and hire up to an endogenously determined size level that depends on
the firms’ access to finance. Firms anticipate the possibility that new funding will be needed over the
lifetime, and that refinancing may not be available in those times. If that happens, the firm must rely
on liquid assets for financing the rebuilding of its physical capital. In the absence of such funds, the
firm is forced to fire workers and close down its operations. When workers are fired, the firm loses
its search capital, defined as the cost of attracting and hiring workers. Ex ante, firms therefore face
a trade-off between investing their limited funds in liquid assets to protect their search capital, or to
invest in more capacity and more employees.
Our theoretical model shows that if labor market frictions disappear, so does the motive for firms
to hold liquid assets. This implies a fundamental complementarity between labor market frictions and
holding of liquid assets by firms that is novel in the literature. In this sense, the paper brings together
the work on liquidity by Holmstrom and Tirole (2011) with the traditional Mortensen Pissarides (1994
and 1999) model of equilibrium unemployment.
While we largely exploit the concept of limited pledgeability, other financial frictions have been
proposed in the literature. First, there exists an early literature, prior to the 2007 financial crisis.
In such early papers, Greenwald-Stiglitz (1993) looked at the risk aversion of firms. Farmer (1985)
studied the financing of quasi-fixed costs, and Townsend (1979) proposed the costly verification model.
Sticky bank borrower relationships also emerge in the context of asymmetric information with moral
hazard (Holmstrom and Tirole, 1997) and adverse selection (Sharpe, 1990). In a macro labor literature
that emerged after the financial crisis, Christiano et al. (2015) looked at the real effects of borrowing
spreads while Hall (2014) and Keho et al. (2014) looked at the labor market impact of schocks to
consumers and firms’ discount rate.
Within the DMP-labor-finance literature, the pioneering work was Wasmer and Weil (2004) in-
1Chodorow-Reich (2014) and Bentolila et al. (2014) use loan level data for the US and Spain during the 2007/09
financial crisis to identify the effects of banks health on employment changes; Boeri, Garibaldi and Moen (BGM, 2013)
review the empirical literature and provide new evidence using macro, sectoral and firm-level data. Pagano and Piga
(2010) use sectoral data to identify the impact of leverage on employment changes, using the methodology proposed by
Rajan and Zingales (1998) to study the relationship between finance and growth.
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vestigation of the interplay between matching frictions in both the labor and the financial markets.
Merz and Yashiv (2007) discussed the relationship between adjustment costs of labor and the value
of the firm. Michelacci and Quadrini (2009) analysed the effects of financial market imperfections
on employment adjustment, and the size distribution of firms. Kueh et al. (2012) integrated search
theory with asset pricing. Finally, there is a growing set of papers studying the links between finance
and labor market volatility within the DMP framework. Eckstein et al. (2014) look at the real effects
of borrowing spreads. Petrosky-Nadaeu and Wasmer (2013) study the dynamic effects and volatility
effects of the double frictions a´ la Wasmer and Weil. Petrosky-Nadaeu (2014) looks at the financial
frictions in the vacancy costs. Garin (2015) and Iliopolus et. al. (2015) investigate the effects of
shocks to collateral in a Kiotaky and Moore (1997) fashion. Boeri-Garibaldi and Moen (2015) study
the interplay between limited pledgeability, job creation and business cycle volatility within the DMP
framework.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents some of the key empirical regularities
between access to credit and employment changes using micro data on firms’ balance sheets and
employment variations over the Great Recession. Section 3 introduces the model, and characterizes
the financial decision of the firm in partial equilibrium. Section 4 derives the general equilibrium
results. Extensions are provided in section 5, while section 6 discusses the key findings of our theory
in a broader perspective. Finally, section 7 concludes.
2 Some facts about access to finance and employment
This section presents some empirical regularities on the relationship between financial conditions and
employment variations of firms.
Specifically, we present facts based on on a dataset of firm-level employment adjustment and
leverage during the Great Recession. The data cover the period 2007-9 and are obtained by matching
data from the EFIGE survey of European firms with information from balance sheets obtained in
the Amadeus archive. Efige samples some 16,000 European firms (3,000 in large countries, such as
Germany, France, Italy, Spain and the UK, and 500 firms in smaller countries, such as Austria and
Hungary). The data in the matched sample cover mainly medium-sized and large firms (the average
firm size in terms of employees is 81).2
Our main variable of interest is employment changes.3 In the statistical annex, we plot the
distribution of employment changes using a Kernel density estimator. As our data cover the Great
Recession, most firms appear to be downsizing.
To summarize regularities and insights as to the importance of finance in employment adjustment,
Figure 1 plots the Kernel estimates for firms that successfully applied for credit (continuous line), as
well as firms that did not apply for credit (dotted line) or that applied, but were not successful (dashed
line). The distribution of job losses among those that unsuccessfully applied for credit lies strictly
above the other two distributions. This suggests that the firms that were unsuccessful in refinancing
operations were, on average, heavily downsizing (on average by almost 20 %) while the distribution of
employment adjustment among successful debtors and firms that did not apply for credit is remarkably
similar (in the latter group there is only a larger proportion of firms not experiencing employment
variations). The concentration of employment losses (about 30 per cent of the total) among firms
experiencing difficulties in refinancing operations is obviously not informative as to causality: it may
well be that firms did not obtain credit because they were downsizing and considered not viable by
2The questionnaire is very detailed on a number of structural characteristics of firms such as organization, job
composition, innovation activities, finance as well as product and labor market strategies. The Amadeus archive
provides financial and business data on Europe’s biggest 500,000 companies by assets.
3We draw on the following question asked to employers at the beginning of 2010: During the last year (2009) did
you experience a reduction or an increase/decrease of your workforce in comparison with 2008? . For those stating to
have changed employment levels, a second question elicited the percentage change in the workforce. We imputed a zero
value to firms declaring that they did not experience any change in employment in the first question
2
Figure 1: Firm-level net employment change, distribution of firms by access to credit
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banks. Yet, the figure clearly reports a link between access to credit and employment changes, as we
summarize in the following.
• Fact 1 Job losses are negatively correlated with access to credit during the financial crisis
In addition to employment changes, we exploit measures of leverage in 2007, the year before the
beginning of the Great Recession. In particular, the Gearing ratio is the debt to equity ratio measuring
the extent to which the firm is using creditor’s vs. owner’s funds, whilst the solvency ratio measures
the ratio of after tax net profit (excluding non-cash depreciation expenses) over debt and is a measure
of one company’s ability to meet long-term obligations. The statistical annex reports some descriptive
statistics on those data.
To correlate financial leverage to employment changes controlling for firm characteristics, we esti-
mate a regression of changes in employment on firm, sector and aggregate country fixed effects, output
variations as well as leverage. In particular, Table 1 reports estimates of the following equation
∆eijc = α+ αj + αc + αj ∗ αcβ∆yjc + γLevijc + δSijc + ijc (1)
where ∆e is the reported employment growth rate during the period 2008-9, i denotes the firm, j the
sector and c the country, S is a set of size dummies (employment or turnover) and Lev is the Gearing
Ratio, measured before the Great Recession (according to 2007 balance sheet data). ∆yjc is change
in the sectoral output. We also include country and sector dummies as well as interactions between
the two sets of dummies. We summarize these results in our second empirical regularity.
• Fact 2 Financial leverage is negatively correlated to net employment changes during the crisis
Fact 2 is reported in Columns (1) and (2) in Table 1. The dependent variable is employment
change. The gearing ratio is negatively associated with plant-level employment change, while the
Solvency Ratio is positively associated with employment changes.
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While these correlations are significant, leverage is clearly endogenous. The growing empirical
literature that has used the Great Recession as an episode of credit contraction is concerned with the
causal effect of credit contraction on employment. Chodorow-Reich (2014) for the U.S. and Bentolila
et al. (2014) for Spain looked at the health conditions of banks during the crisis as a way to identify
the shock to credit independently of the firm conditions. They both found evidence of a causal effect
of credit disruption on employment losses. We use our dataset to see whether we can confirm the
presence of a causal effect of leverage on job losses during a financial crisis.
Columns (3) to (6) of Table 1 display 2-stages least squares estimates in which leverage is instru-
mented by a dichotomic variable capturing firms that can use third party collateral being part of a
consortium of firms. The underlying identification assumption is that the presence of this collateral
affects the (equilibrium) level of leverage prevailing before the financial crisis while it does not directly
affect employment variation during the Great Recession. The first-stage results point to a significant
and positive (negative) effect of third party collateral on leverage (solvency). Access to third party
collateral increases the probability that firms can draw on external finance. To the extent that a
firm is part of a consortium of firms offering third party collateral, we expect this firm to face lower
costs of borrowing and, ceteris paribus, be more leveraged than firms not being part of consortia of
this type. There is an extensive literature in finance supporting this hypothesis4 , and our first stage
results indicate that indeed leverage is positively affected by access to third party collateral. True
that involvement in consortia of firms, in addition to capital mobility, may also involve labor mobility
within the consortium of firms. However, labor is less mobile than capital, and it is particularly less
so under a generalized shock like a recession. Thus, the possibility to absorb shocks via realloca-
tions of workers across firms in the consortium is limited. Notice further that our regressions include
size and sector dummies as well as interactions between the two, capturing potential key factors of
heterogeneity across firms.5
In the second stage we still find a negative and statistically significant effect of leverage and
solvency on firm-level employment adjustment. The effects of leverage on employment adjustment is
non-negligible: bringing, say, a typical Austrian firm to the average gearing ratio of a German firm
involves additional employment losses of the order of 3 per cent during a financial recession; increasing
by 10 basis points the solvency ratio (like moving an average Italian firm to France) involves a 6 per
cent increase of employment.6
This confirms the following empirical regularity.
• Fact 3 Financial leverage negatively affects employment changes during the crisis
Where do the effects of leverage on job losses come from? Columns (5) and (6) display estimates
of equation (1) when only firms downsizing or only firms upsizing are considered. The focus is on
leverage, but the results are the same when we consider solvency ratios. They suggest that after the
financial crisis the effect of leverage on firm-level employment adjustment is driven by firms that are
downsizing. For upsizing firms the second-stage coefficient is negative, but not statistically significant7.
Thus, we have
4See, for instance, the 2010 special issue on partial credit guarantees of the Journal of Financial Stability.
5Access to third party collateral is generally unrelated to individual firm’s characteristics, as membership of the
consortia depends on the sectoral or regional affiliation of the firm. However, in some countries membership of the
consortium may be based on the screening of the applicants, and potentially on characteristics which are themselves
correlated with employment variation over the Great Recession. To the extent that these consortia are typically devices
allowing firms to improve their access to capital markets, they confine access to firms that are in rather good financial
conditions, as the other members perceive the negative externalities that could be exerted over the entire consortium by
firms in financial distress. We expect firms in bad financial conditions to have downscaled during the Great Recession.
Hence selection of firms into the consortia based on good financial conditions would work against our results.
6As shown by the bottom row of Table 7, the 2SLS estimates have substantially less observations that the OLS
estimates. This is because there are many missing values in the question about third party collateral. We did run
regressions replacing missing values with 0, but did not find substantial differences
7We also run regressions including firm-level output growth (rather than the average growth rate at the sectoral
level) as right-hand-side variable. Such a specification clearly creates a problem of endogeneity, but potentially cap-
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Table 1: Leverage and Employment Adjustment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variables ∆e(%) ∆e(%) ∆e(%) ∆e(%) ∆e(%) ∆e(%)
Sample All firms All firms All firms All firms Downsizing Upsizing
Method OLS OLS IV IV IV IV
Second stage
∆y¯ 1.11 1.05 -57.31 98.56 95.87 33.53
(0.910) (0.901) (133.3) (169.1) (132.8) (679.9)
Gearing -0.01*** -0.03** -0.34* -0.03
(0.00) (0.01) (0.02) (0.17)
Solvency 0.04*** 0.60***
(0.01) (0.21)
Constant -8.12*** -10.73*** -13.09 -13.19 -24.75 0.98
(2.59) (2.63) (17.11) (20.69) (16.62) (106.20)
Country YES YES YES YES YES YES
Sector YES YES YES YES YES YES
Country*Sector YES YES YES YES YES YES
Size YES YES YES YES YES YES
First stage
Gearing Solvency Gearing Gearing
Third party collateral 108.24*** -6.85*** 88.37*** 31.11***
(16.48) (1.69) (21.31) (68.12)
Observations 8596 9649 2358 2900 1195 307
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
• Fact 4 The effects of financial leverage on employment changes during a financial crisis are
concentrated in downsizing firms.
Overall, our results suggest that leverage matters for employment adjustment during a financial
recession, and operates mainly along the gross job destruction margin. Ceteris paribus, more leveraged
firms destroy more jobs than firms with a higher solvency ratio.
3 Model
Our starting point is a directed search model of the labor market, where entrepreneurs pay a fixed cost
of entry and may potentially hire many workers in a labor market with frictions, and where the initial
investments are financed by borrowing in an imperfect financial market. This section goes through
the building blocks of the theory. First, we describe in some details the environment, and the timing
of the model. In section 3.2 we focus on the labor market friction and the search process. Section
3.4 describes the financial contract while section 3.3 presents the asset value equations. Section 3.5
presents the financial decision in partial equilibrium. General equilibrium and the key propositions
are derived in section 4.
tures idiosyncratic shocks unrelated to the financial recession. Also in this case, there is still an effect of leverage
on employment growth. As a further robustness check we run regressions putting on the left-hand-side a categorical
variable (0 for downsizing, 1 for firms keeping the same employment level, 2 for those upsizing) in order to cope with
measurement error, notably heaping in the reporting of employment adjustment. There is still a statistically significant
effect. Coefficients are remarkably stable across these different specifications
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3.1 The environment
We study a model of risk neutral workers and firms, who discount the future at the same rate r. There
is mass one of a infinitely lived workers. Entrepreneurs set up firms, finance their investment in a
credit market with frictions, and hire workers in a labor market that also contains frictions. As there
is free entry of firms, the supply of entrepreneurs is infinitely elastic.
Entrepreneurs set up a firm at cost F . We assume that F is an effort cost, and hence does not
need financing. Then entrepreneurs invest in A units of capacity (A machines), where A is decided
endogenously by the firms. The unit cost of capacity is normalized to 1. The maximum capacity
of firms is irreversible and cannot be increased later on. The production technology is Leontief in
workers and machines, hence the firm hires A workers. Output is linear in the number of jobs with
marginal productivity equal to y, so that the total output is f(A) = yA. The workers stay with the
firm until their job is destroyed.
After the workers are hired, a firm produces until it is hit by a negative shock, which arrives at
probability rate λ. We refer to this as a λ-shock. The shock destroys the machines, and makes all
contracts void. The firm, if it gets refinancing, can reinvest, buy new machines, and retain the workers.
If it does not get refinancing, it has to rely on its own internal financial resources for reinvestments.
If production continues, the wage contracts are renegotiated, and in this renegotiation game the firms
have all the bargaining power. Hence, after refinancing, the employees will receive their outside option.
This assumption will be relaxed in section 5 when we study the effects of wage renegotiations after
the shock..
The process of matching vacant jobs to unemployed workers is characterized by a standard aggre-
gate matching function. Firms post costly vacancies to attract workers. Attached to each vacancy, the
firm posts a present discounted wage of W . In this sense, our model is coherent with the competitive
search specification a-la-Moen. Search is directed, and firms maximize profits given the life-time value
of unemployment, U . As will be clear below, firms attract workers immediately by paying an upfront
search cost. In this respect, the specification and characterization of the search process used in our
paper is coherent with the fixed cost approach taken by Blanchard and Gali (2010), and represents a
microfoundation of their assumption in terms of competitive search.
The entrepreneurs have no financial wealth of their own, and finance their investments through
credit. The entrepreneurs receive an exogenous income flow y0, independently of production levels.
In addition, they obtain income by the production process. As in Holmstrom and Tirole, the financial
friction in our model is that an entrepreneur cannot commit to repay her entire future income obtained
by the production process. More specifically, we assume that the entrepreneur can commit to repay
her exogenous income y0 (the private income which is necessary in order to get any borrowing at all)
plus a fraction strictly less than one of the income the project is expected to generate. There may
be several reasons why the entrepreneur cannot borrow on the entire future income flow. First, part
of the gain from running a business may be a private, non-pecuniary, benefit which cannot easily
be transferred to the creditor. Second, in order to provide incentives to the entrepreneur to make
the right decisions, taking properly care of the machines and so on, the entrepreneur must have a
sufficiently large stake in the project. We refer to the part of the income that the entrepreneur can
commit to repay as the entrepreneur’s pledgeable income.
The time horizon of the initial contract with the financier is up to the point where the λ-shock
hits. At this point, the machines are gone, and the contracts are void.8 Hence, at the point of firm
creation, the firm cannot borrow on incomes (neither y0 nor the output flow) that accrue after the
shock.
A key feature of our model is that the firm may want to build financial reserves prior to the
λ-shock in order to be able to self-finance the reinvestment costs if it cannot get refinancing through
the financial system. The size of the financial reserves is denoted I, I ≤ A. The financial reserves are
8Technically speaking, the collateral is the income flow from the machines, not the machines themselves. However,
the income flow is gone when the machines are destroyed by the λ shock.
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liquid assets. They may consist of cash, treasuries or liquid stocks. Potentially, even real estate could
be considered, even though we prefer to think of I in terms of financial assets.9 In order to simplify
the exposition, and avoid tedious and complicated tracking of the the accumulated interests on the
reserves when the λ-shock hits, we assume that the firm places the assets I at an intermediary. The
intermediary promises to pay the firm an amount I when the λ-shock hits, at an ex ante cost of λ˜I,
where λ˜ = λ/(r + λ).10
To summarize, the life cycle of a firm is as follows:
1. The entrepreneur sinks a fixed effort cost F in order to create the firm.
2. The entrepreneur signs a contract with a financial intermediary, and invests in machines A and
financial assets I.
3. Job creation and hiring take place.
4. The firm produces until a λ-shock hits. The shock destroys the machines, and renders all
contracts void, and the firm has to reinvest in new machines.
(a) With probability 1− τ , the firm gets refinancing. A new machines are bought at full cost,
and workers are retained and paid their outside option that we indicate with U .
(b) With probability τ , the firm does not get refinancing. The firm uses its financial reserves
to buy I ≤ A machines at full cost. I workers are retained, and A− I worker are displaced.
Both the displaced and retired workers get their outside options U .
5. The firm continues to produce until a second adverse λ shock concludes the life of the firm.
3.2 Search
Employees are costly to acquire due to search frictions. Gali and Blanchard (2010) assume that
firms attract workers immediately, but have to pay a hiring cost per worker equal to C(), where
C is a function of aggregate variables that each firm takes as given. With financial frictions, it is
convenient that firms attract workers without a time lag. We will now show how this can be obtained
endogenously in a way that is fully coherent with the Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides framework, by
allowing firms to post many vacancies per job slot. Furthermore, the hiring cost C will only be a
function of U , the expected net present value of the future income flow of an unemployed worker.
We assume that search is competitive (Moen (1997), Shimer (1996), and Mortensen and Wright
(2002)).11 At the aggregate level, a constant return to scale matching function x(u, v) maps the stocks
of searching workers u and firms with vacancies v into a flow x of new hires. To simplify some of the
expressions we assume that the matching function is Cobb-Douglas, i.e., that x(u, v) = uβv1−β . Let
p(θ) denote the job finding rate of searching workers and q(θ) the arrival rate of workers to searching
firms, where θ = v/u is labor market tightness.
A firm i posts vi vacancies, and each vacancy comes with a rent Ri = Wi − U , where Wi is the
net present value of the future income flow of a worker hired in firm i. The firm can post as many
vacancies as it wants at cost c per vacancy. The instantaneous probability rate of finding a worker
when vi vacancies are posted is viq(θ), where θ depends on the rent Ri offered. Since the expected
9In section 6 we discuss the empirical evidence on firm liquidity around the Great Recession.
10To see that this is a fair price, note that
rλ˜I = λ(I − λ˜I)
λ˜ =
λ
r + λ
11For a large-firm application (as in the present paper) see Garibaldi, Moen and Sommervold (2015) and Kaas and
Kircher(2013).
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time to fill a single vacancy when the firm has vi vacancies open is
1
viq(θ)
, the time necessarily to fill a
vacancy tends to zero as v becomes infinitely large. Furthermore, as the value of a filled job exceeds
the expected search cost (this must be true in equilibrium, since the firm has to capitalize the fixed
cost F ), the firm has an incentive to post as many vacancies as possible. As vi goes to infinity, the
flow cost γvi also goes to infinity. In the limit, the worker is obtained immediately, hence we can
ignore discounting. The search cost per worker is thus equal to limvi→∞
γvi
q(θ)vi
= γq(θ) . In words, this
means that as vi goes to infinity, the firm receives a worker immediately at search cost γ/q(θ).
From a worker’s standpoint, the rent R and the job finding probability p(θ) are connected through
the life time value of unemployment, as
rU = z + θq(θ)R (2)
where R is the equilibrium worker rents offered by firms. In equilibrium, workers receive the same
expected income independently of which firms they search for, so that Ri = R, where Ri is the rent
offered by firm i. The relationship between θ and R into equation (2), is akin to a unemployed
indifference curve, and highlights the workers’ tradeoff between R and market tightness θ.
We define hiring cost for the firm as the costs associated with employing the worker, over and above
his opportunity cost rU of working in the firm. Total hiring cost in firm i is thus A(γ/q(θ) +Ri), and
total hiring cost per worker is C = γ/q(θ) +Ri.
12 As will be clear below, the firm has an incentive to
minimize total hiring cost per worker, and hence solves the problem
C = min
[
γ
q(θ)
+Ri
]
S.T. rU = z + θq(θ)R (3)
Total hiring cost per worker is a function of U , and we write C = C(U). Below we refer to C(U) as
the search capital associated with having one worker on board. In the the theoretical annex we show
that the total hiring cost function is
C(U) =
γ
q
1
1− β (4)
where
θ(U) =
rU − z
γ
1− β
β
It follows that C ′(U) > 0 and θ′(U) > 0. With a Cobb-Douglas matching function, one can show that
C ′′(U) < 0.
Another issue is the time profile of wages. We assume that the worker is paid a fixed wage w up
to the λ-shock hits. The fixed wage is given by
w = rU + (r + λ)R (5)
which gives an expected rent of R. Alternatively, the firm could pay the entire rent upfront. As will
be clear shortly, the time profile of the wage up to the λ shock is irrelevant, even in the presence of
financial frictions.
3.3 Asset values
Let M(A, I) denote the joint present discounted value of revenues obtained by a firm of size A with
financial resources I. Since wage payments are a transfer between the firm and the workers, they do
not enter in the joint income. Furthermore, recall that the worker after a λ-shock obtains his outside
option, independently of whether he is retained or fired. The asset value equation for joint present
discounted income, M(A, I), thus reads
12In the literature, hiring costs are often paid upfront. In our setting, a part of the hiring cost c/q are paid upfront,
while Ri may be paid at the start of or during the employment relationship.
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rM(A, I) = yA+ λ {UA+ J(A, I)−M(A)} (6)
where J(A, I) is the value of the firm after the shock. The left-hand-side is the asset returns of a
firm of value M . The right-hand-side is the sum of the flow output yA and the capital gain (or, in
this case, capital loss) associated with the λ-shock. The latter consists of firm profit J(A, I) and the
outside option of the workforce U , less M .
We now need to specify the firm profit J(A, I). When a λ-shock occurs, the firm will receive
external funding with probability 1− τ . In this case, the firm borrows A− I units. With probability
τ , the firm does not get funding, and invests its I units of reserves. The firm can produce until a
second λ-shock occurs, which destroys the firm. It follows that we can write J(A, I) as
J(A, I) = τI
y − rU
r + λ
+ (1− τ)[Ay − rU
r + λ
− (A− I)] (7)
The total surplus from a firm S(A, I), is defined as the joint income net of the outside option of the
worker, so that S(A, I) = M(A, I)−AU . Using equation (6), this implies
S(A, I) =
y − rU + λJ(A, I)
r + λ
A (8)
Firms maximize profits. The inital cost of obtaining A machines and workers, and financial resources
I, is equal to A(1 + C(U)) + λ˜I. Total profits thus read
V (A, I) = S(A, I)−A(1 + C(U))− λ˜I
Inserting from equations (7) and (8) and manipulating gives a compact expression for the profits.
V (A, I) =
[
y − rU
r + λ
− 1
](
1 + λ˜(1− τ)
)
A︸ ︷︷ ︸
Capacity
+
[
y − rU
r + λ
− 1
]
τ λ˜I︸ ︷︷ ︸
Liquid Asset
−C(U)A︸ ︷︷ ︸
Hiring
(9)
There are three components of the profits. The first component shows the net present profit of
investing in capacity. It is the product of three factors. The first factor is the net present value of
the return from investing in one machine, with the cost of labour equal to the opportunity cost rU .
The second factor shows the discounted number of times each unit of capacity will be utilized in the
absence of reserves, taking into account that there is a probability 1−τ that the firm can reinvest, and
this has to be weighted down by λ˜ since the investment happens in the future, and the firm discounts
the future. The last factor is total capacity A. The second component is the net present value of
investing in liquid assets. It is again the product of three terms. The first factor is again the net
present value of the return from investing in one machine. The factor τ is the probability that the
reserves are needed, while the factor λ˜ captures discounting. The last factor is the size of the financial
reserves. The third component is the total hiring costs C(U)A, and it is just the product of hiring
cost per worker times the number of employees.
3.4 Financial constraints
In order to invest in capacity, the firm needs finance, which is obtained in a financial market with
frictions. The fixed cost F implies that there are increasing return to scale in production. Hence the
firms wants to become as large as possible. However, their expansion is curbed by the availability of
finance. As we anticipated in the description of the environment, we follow Holmstrom and Tirole
and assume that at the initial stage the entrepreneur cannot commit to repay her entire future income
to a creditor. It can only repay its pleadgeable income. While we already discussed the various
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theoretical motivations behind limited pledgeability, we stress that the entrepreneur cannot save her
non-pledgeable income. 13
Formally, we assume that the non-pledgeable income is proportional to the number of machines
the entrepreneur controls, i.e., it is equal to xA, where x is a parameter.14 Let p˜ denote the pledgeable
income flow if the firm invests A units of capacity. Then
p˜ = y0 + (y − w¯ − x)A
(10)
where y0 is the exogenous income flow, and w¯ is given by (5). The NPV of the pledgeable income, P˜ ,
writes15
P˜ = Y0 +A
y − w¯ − x
r + λ
= Y0 +A
y − x− rU
r + λ
−AR (11)
where Y0 = y0/(r+λ), and R =
w¯−rU
r+λ from (5). If the firm borrows P˜ , it pays back all its pledgeable
income until the machine is destroyed and the contract is terminated.16
The firm can use its available financial resources to invest in machines and search, or to build
financial reserves. The financial constraint the firm faces can be written as P˜ ≥ (γ/q + 1)A + λ˜I.
Substituting for P˜ gives
Y0 +A
y − rU − x
r + λ
≥ (C(U) + 1)A+ λ˜I (12)
since C(U) = c/q + R. We denote the left-hand-side of the equation by (12) by P . Hence, the
borrowing constraint reads
P ≥ (C(U) + 1)A+ λ˜I (13)
where, in words, P is the pledgeable income that accrues if the firm pays the worker a wage equal
to his opportunity cost rU . This can be spent on machines, direct search costs, and worker rents R
(wages in excess of rU) through C(U).
Note that although worker rent is paid after the worker is employed, it is total hiring cost C(U) =
γ/q + R that emerges on the right-hand-side. Hence direct search costs c/q and worker rents R tap
equally much into the firm’s financial resources. It follows that the financial frictions do not give the
firm incentives to twist their choice of R in order to ease the financial constraint. Hence, as already
anticipated, the firm will always choose to set the workers’ wage so as to minimize the total hiring
cost C(U). We refer to this as decoupling between the firm’s wage policy and the financial friction it
faces.
Proposition 1 Decoupling between wages and finance: financial frictions do not directly influence
the firm’s wage setting
Even though the wage payment occurs later than the direct search cost, it is subtracted one to one
from the pledgeable income, hence it creates the same financial burden as upfront investments in
search costs.
13Note, however, that the assumption is easily rationalized if the non-pledgeable income is private benefits. However,
the assumption is made for convenience. As long as accumulated retained earnings is likely to be less than the reinvest-
ment needed, accumulated savings will only influence the size of the liquid asset, not whether the firm will have one or
not (due to the linear structure of the model, as explained in the text).
14In an earlier version of the paper we showed that all the results also go through if we instead write the non-pledgeable
income as a fraction of output net of the opportunity cost of workers, ρ(y − rU), where ρ is a constant.
15We assume that y − rU − x > 0. This will be true in equilibrium.
16Note that ex ante, the wage-tenure profile does not matter for P˜ , only the expeced net present value of wages until
the λ-shock hits.
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3.5 Financial decisions in partial equilibrium
We will now analyse the firms’ financial decision. This is its choice of size A and financial reserves I
in partial equilibrium, for a given value of U . To simplify notation, we suppress endogenous variables’
dependence of U . The firms’ financial decision solves
V (U) = max
A,I
V (A, I) (14)
s.t. Iλ˜+ (1 + C)A− P ≥ 0
0 ≤ I ≤ A; A ≥ 0; I ≥ 0
Solving for A, and assuming that the borrowing constraint binds, gives
A =
Y0 − λ˜I
1 + C − y−rU−xr+λ
(15)
= k(Y0 − λ˜I)
We refer to k = 1
1+C− y−rU−xr+λ
as the investment multiplier, and it is a function of U . It shows the
maximum units of capacity the firm can finance per unit of exogenous income Y0 the entrepreneur is
in possession of. It follows that
dI
dA
= − 1
kλ˜
(16)
so that the borrowing constraint is just a negatively sloped line in a (I, A) space.
The firm’s objective function is a linear function of A and I, and the financial constraint is also
linear in A and I. Hence the firm’s maximization problem generically has a corner solution. Either
the firm will go for maximum capacity, or it will hold liquid assets so that it can refinance all the
machines. We call the latter, the Liquid Asset Equilibrium (LA equilibrium, hereafter), when formally
firms set I = A. Conversely, we call the former a No Liquid Asset Equilibrium (NoLA equilibrium,
hereafter) and all firms set I = 0. By substituting the borrowing constraint into the objective function
and taking derivatives, we find that the firm will choose to hold liquid assets if[
y − rU
r + λ
− 1
]
(1 + λ˜(1− τ)) ≤ C +
[
y − rU
r + λ
− 1
]
τ
k
. (17)
The left-hand-side shows the gain from hiring one more worker. The right-hand-side shows the gain
from having 1/k more units in liquid assets, including the search cost savings of not expanding capacity
today.
Let D denote the difference between the right-hand-side and the left-hand-side of (17). We say that
a high value of a parameter pushes the firm toward liquid assets if D is increasing in the parameter
around the bliss point D = 0. We say that a high value of the parameter pushes the firm toward more
capacity if D is decreasing in the parameter.
Lemma 1 In partial equilibrium, for a given U , the following holds
1. A high probability of distress, τ , pushes the firm toward liquid assets
2. A high value of the pledgeability parameter x (large financial frictions) pushes the firm toward
liquid assets
3. A high value of the search cost γ pushes the firm toward liquid assets
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An increase in τ increases the probability that the financial resources are needed, hence they are more
valuable to the firm. A reduction in pledgeable income (an increase in x) reduces the multiplier k,
and hence reduces the shadow cost of investing in the liquid asset. This pushes the firm towards liquid
assets. An increase in the search cost γ increases C (for a given U). This has two effects. First, it
reduces the multiplier. Second, it makes it more expensive to expand capacity. Botth effects increases
the right-hand side of (17) and pushes the firm towards liquid assets.
4 General equilibrium
In general equilibrium, firms enter the market up to the point were the value V (U) of profits is equal
to the cost F of entering. Similarly, let V I(U) denote the value of a firm that holds financial reserves
and sets I = A. In words, V A(U) and V I(U) are, respectively, the value of profits in a NoLA
equilibrium and in a LA equilibrium. Clearly, V (U) = Max
[
V A(U);V I(U)
]
. Hence we can define
general equilibrium as follows17
Definition 1 The general equilibrium of the model is a vector (A∗, I∗, U∗, C∗) that satisfies
1. Optimal search behavior by firms: C∗ is the solution to (3)
2. The firms’ choice of capacity A∗ and liquid assets I solves (14)
3. Free Entry of firms, V (U∗) = F
From the envelope theorem, it follows directly that V I(U) and V A(U) are strictly decreasing in
U . It is also straightforward to show that V (U) ≡ max{V I(U), V A(U)} is continuous and strictly
decreasing in U . Existence and uniqueness thereby follows more or less directly.
Proposition 2 The general equilibrium exists if
y − z
r + λ
> F
Generically, the equilibrium is unique
Note that for any given U , the firms choose one of the corners I = A or I = U , except in the non-generic
case with V A(U) = V I(U), in which case the choice of A and I are indeterminate. Furthermore, since
V (U) is strictly decreasing in U , the zero profit condition ensures a unique equilibrium value of U . To
understand why, note that the only market parameter that influences firm profits and the financial
decision is U . For a given U , a firm’s financial choice is unaffected by the other firms’ financial choices.
Liquid asset or firm capacity in general equilibrium
Parallel with our definition in partial equilibrium, we say that an increase in a parameter ψ (where
ψ can be any parameter in the model) pushes the equilibrium towards liquid assets if, from an initial
situation where firms are indifferent between holding liquidity or not (UA = U I), an increase in ψ
implies that all firms hold liquid assets.
It is not trivial to see how parameters change the liquidity-size trade off, as shifts in parameters
typically have several countervailing effects. In particular, studying the effects of parameter changes
on the inequality (17) is a difficult route, as partial and general equilibrium effects tend to operate in
opposite directions.
17We do not specify unemployment rates and employment in new and old firms. See the theoretical annex for details
on labor stocks
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Note, however, that at the point where firms are indifferent between holding liquid assets or not,
V I = V A = V = F . In particular, the zero profit condition for no liquid assets without liquid assets
read (from (9) and (15))
Y0k
[
y − rU∗
r + λ
(1 + λ˜(1− τ))− (1 + C(U∗))
]
≡ F (18)
Let V (I;U∗) denote the value of the firm that has I units of liquid assets at the equilibrium value
U∗. Insert (15) into the expression for the value of a firm, (9), to get
V (I;U∗) = (Y0 − λ˜I)k
[
y − rU∗
r + λ
(1 + λ˜(1− τ))− (1 + C(U∗))
]
+ τ λ˜I(
y − rU∗
r + λ
− 1)
Taking derivatives gives
∂V (I;U∗)
∂I
= −λ˜k
[
y − rU∗
r + λ
(1 + λ˜(1− τ))− (1 + C(U∗))
]
+ τ λ˜(
y − rU∗
r + λ
− 1)
Inserting from (18) gives
∂V (I;U∗)
∂I
= −λ˜ F
Y0
+ τ λ˜(
y − rU∗
r + λ
− 1) (19)
At the point of indifference, where V A(U∗) = V I(U∗), by definition it has to be true that ∂V (I;U
∗)
∂I = 0.
The next lemma follows immediately
Lemma 2 An increase in a parameter ψ pushes the equilibrium towards liquid assets if and only if it
increases the righ-hand-side of (19).
The lemma is very convenient in order to establish how the demand for liquid assets is linked to
aggregate variables. The following proposition follows almost immediately:
Proposition 3 The following two results hold in general equilibrium
• Increased search costs γ pushes the equilibrium towards liquid assets, and in a frictionless market
with γ = 0, firms do not invest in liquidity.
• An increase in y and in τ pushes the equilibrium towards liquid assets. An increase in x and in
unemployment income z pushes the equilibrium away from liquid assets.
The proposition follows more or less directly from lemma 2. A formal proof is given in the theoretical
annex. The first bullet point states that there is a complementarity between financial frictions and
labor market frictions. In the presence of financial frictions, a firm’s desire to hold liquid assets is
created by search frictions. Without search frictions, there is no search capital to protect, and the
firms will not hold liquid assets. Furthermore, as higher search frictions increase the search capital,
increased search frictions pushes the equilibrium towards liquid assets.
Higher output means a tighter labor market, and this increases the value of search capital. Hence,
under higher productivity, firms have stronger incentives to protect the search capital by holding liquid
assets.
Recall that τ reflects how frequently a firm cannot get refinancing, and hence can be considered as
a measure of the quality of the financial system, with a low value of τ reflecting a high-quality financial
system. The more likely it is that the financial system will fail, the stronger are the incentives to hold
liquid assets. Also the parameter x reflects the quality of the financial system. A higher x increases
the shadow cost of holding liquid assets. Again, a higher quality of the financial system favors size,
and self-financing through liquid assets becomes less attractive.
For changes in F and Y0, proposition 3 (or lemma 2) gives us no guidance. The direct and indirect
effects (through U∗) in (19) have different signs. Hence we are unable to derive general results on
whether changes in F or Y favor liquidity or not.
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Comparative statics within regimes
We can easily derive various comparative static results summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 4 In equilibrium, the following holds
1. A marginal increase in the difficulty of obtaining refinancing (an increase in τ), has no effect
on the LA equilibrium, while it reduces welfare U in the NLA equilibrium
2. Increased pledgeability (reduced x) increases the value of unemployment and the market tightness
and reduces equilibrium unemployment in both types of equilibria.
3. An increase in firm productivity (y) increases the value of unemployment, market tightness and
reduces equilibrium unemployment in both types of equilibria.
4. An increase in the entry cost, F , reduces the value of unemployment, market tightness and
increases equilibrium unemployment in both types of equilibria.
The proofs are straightforward and omitted.
5 Extensions
Heterogeneous firms
In our framework all firms are identical, and hence face the same trade-off regarding investment in
liquid assets versus physical capacity. In order to get cross-sectional differences, we have to introduce
firm heterogeneity. To this end, suppose τ is stochastic, and realized upon entry after F is sunk.18
Let V (U, τ˜) denote the value of a firm with a realization of τ equal to τ˜ . The zero profit condition of
the firm then reads E τ˜V (U∗, τ˜) = F .
Lemma 3 Suppose that in general equilibrium, the firms prefer liquid assets if τ˜ = 1. Then there
exists a unique τ∗, 0 < τ∗ ≤ 1, so that firms hold liquid asset if and only if τ˜ ≥ τ∗
Note that V A(τ˜ ;U∗) is strictly decreasing in τ˜ , while V I(τ˜ ;U∗) is independent of τ˜ . Furthermore,
it is always true that V A(0;U∗) > V I(0;U∗), while, by assumption, V A(1;U∗) ≤ V I(1;U∗). Hence
there exists a unique value τ∗ such that V A(τ∗;U∗) = V I(τ∗;U∗).
Firms with a low τ will be more leveraged than firms with high τ . Hence, the model implies that
leveraged firms are larger, and fire more workers when refinancing fails than do firms with a high value
of τ .
Unexpected financial crisis
We define a financial crisis as a situation in which a subset of firm creditors require that firms repay
an amount T < P immediately. We may think of this as credit facilities (credit lines) suddenly drying
up. We assume that the crisis only lasts for an instance, so that U is not affected. Finally, we assume
that the crisis is unanticipated.
For firms with liquid assets, the forced repayment shock does not create problems, as they can use
their liquidity to repay T . Furthermore, since the shock lasts for an instant, the probability that a
refinancing shock occurs during the crisis is zero.
In order for a firm without liquid assets to repay, it has to sell off its machines. Suppose that the
scrap value of a machine is κ, κ > y−rU−xr+λ . Hence the value of the machine is higher than the NPV of
the pledgeable income flow the machine creates.19 In order to repay the loan, the firm sells machines
and lay off workers. It will have to lay off a total of H/κ workers.
18Note that we could just as well impose heterogeneity in terms of x or y rather than τ
19If this was not the case, selling off machines would make the firm insolvent
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Proposition 5 Suppose that a financial crisis hits, in the form of a repayment shock H. This has no
effect on firms with liquid assets. Firms without liquid assets fire H/κ workers, and the unemployment
rate increases.
If the firm has to pay a firing tax to the replaced workers, this will increase the amount of firing
the firm has to undertake. If the firing tax is t, the firm has to fire a total of H/(κ− t) workers.
Note that as long as κ < 1, resources are lost when the firm fires the workers. For each unit of
capacity it sells, the firm only pays back κ < 1 units of debt. When funds again are available, the
amount the firm can borrow is smaller than before the crisis, hence the firm cannot scale up the loan
to the pre-crisis level. It can be shown that each unit of capacity that the firm scraps has the same
effects as reducing Y0 with 1− κ units in terms of borrowing potential when funds are again available
(under the assumption that the laid off workers can be called back at no cost. Otherwise the set-back
would be even worse). Hence the financial crisis has a scarring effect on employment in existing firms.
Wage bargaining after the shock
In the baseline model, we assumed that if production continued after a λ-shock, the firm had all the
bargaining power and workers were receiving their outside option U . We now relax this assumption.
We assume that the workers at that stage bargain over the wage, and receive a share α of the surplus.
The surplus per worker after the shock is y−rUr+λ , hence the worker who is retained gets a surplus
α y−rUr+λ . Note that the reinvestment cost is not a part of the surplus the agents bargain over. We
assume that the worker’s bargaining power is not too high so that firms will invest after the shock if
funding is available.
We assume that when a job is advertised, it is informed whether the firm has financial resources
so that the job can continue after a shock. If this is the case, we say that the job is funded. In other
words, the worker can observe the financial assets I, and if I < A, which jobs the funds are attached
to (this is not important, as in equilibrium either all or none of the jobs are funded). Hence workers,
when evaluating the attractiveness of the job, take into account whether the job is funded or not. We
shall now indicate with Ri2 (i ∈ {0, 1}, i = 1 if the vacancy is funded, 0 if it is not), the net present
value to the worker of the rents obtained through bargaining after a negative shock. The subscript 2
refers to the second period in the life of the firm, after the first λ shock hits. Ri2 (i ∈ {0, 1}, i = 1 if
funded) is given by
Ri2 = λ˜α[
y − rU
r + λ
((1− τ) + τI[i = 1])]
where I[i = 1] is an indicator function, equal to 1 if the job is funded and 0 if it is not.
The firm’s trade-off between rents and search costs is not altered by renegotiation ex post. In
particular, the firm still minimizes C(U) defined by (3) with solution (4). Let R be total rent the
worker receives, and R1 the rent the worker receives before the shock hits (which is equal to
w¯−rU
r+λ
with constant wages). Note that it is only R1 that is paid out before the shock hits. The worker
only cares about the total rents R = R1 + R
i
2 that she gets, not the time profile of the rent. As
a result, the worker captures some of the rent after the shock comes at no cost to the firm, as the
firm can reduce the rent given to the worker before the shock occurs dollar for dollar. Furthermore,
since Ri2 is exogenous to the firm for a given i, attracting workers by paying higher wages or by
paying for vacancies, at the margin, taps equally much into the firm’s financial reserves. Hence ex
post bargaining does not change the rents/search cost trade-off the firm faces. This implies that the
decoupling between wages and financial frictions outlined in proposition 1 is still valid.
Nevertheless, giving bargaining power to the workers after the shock reduces the wage the firm
has to pay before the shock, and eases the financial constraint of the firm. Let C˜i(U) = C(U) − Ri2
denote the part of the total hiring cost that is paid out before the shock hits. It follows that (12)
reads
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Y0 +A
y − rU − x
r + λ
≥ (C˜0 + 1)A− λ˜(1− ταy − rU
r + λ
)I
= (C˜0 + 1)A− λˆI
where λˆ = λ˜(1 − τα y−rUr+λ ), which clearly is less than λ˜. It follows that the multiplier, kˆ, is given by
(analogous to 15)
kˆ =
1
1 + C˜0 − y−rU−xr+λ
Comparing the multiplier kˆ with the value of k in the case of no renegotiation of equation (15), it
follows that kˆ > k.
The ex ante asset value function of the firm profit is unchanged. Note that the reduction in ex post
profits after the λ-shock is realized exactly offsets the reduced cost of attracting the worker before the
shock, C(U)− C˜(U). We can now rewrite (17) as[
y − rU
r + λ
− 1
]
(1 + λ˜(1− τ)) ≤ C + (
[
y − rU
r + λ
− 1
]
λ˜
λˆ
τ
kˆ
. (20)
The impact of wage bargaining on the size-liquid asset trade-off is not clear, as λˆ < λ˜ while kˆ > k.
However, for τ sufficiently large, ex post wage bargaining makes liquid assets more attractive (as τ
goes to 1, kˆ goes to k). Hence there exists a τˆ ≥ 0 such that the following Lemma follows.
Lemma 4 With ex post renogatiation and value of τ > τˆ , ex post, wage bargaining makes liquid assets
more attractive.
Note also that the structure of equation (17) and equation (20) is the same, hence Lemma 2 still holds.
Let us then turn to general equilibrium. Since the asset values are unaffected, it follows that
equation (19) can be rewritten as
∂V (I;U∗)
∂I
= −λˆ F
Y0
+ τ λˆ(
y − rU∗
r + λ
− 1) (21)
In the theoretical annex we show that proposition 3 still holds. Hence, although wage bargaining ex
post eases the financial constraint, the responses of changes in parameters on the demand for liquid
assets are unchanged.
6 Discussion and implications
In this paper we integrate limited pledgeability with labor market imperfections. We construct an
archetype model for analysing the interplay between labor and financial imperfections. There are at
least four main lessons that can be learned from our theory.
First, we uncover a key complementarity between firms holding of liquid assets and labor market
imperfections. In our model the corporate sector holds liquidity as a way to protect its search capital.
The latter is defined as the total hiring cost created by labor market imperfections. The model predicts
also that firms do not hold liquid assets when labor market frictions disappear. While we are aware
that the precautionary motives for firms holding cash and liquid assets are many, the complementarity
between liquid assets and labor market imperfections is novel and should be investigated in future
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empirical work.20 If we take literally the structure of our model, the larger are the labor market
frictions, the larger should be the amount of cash held within the firms. We thus expect that firms
operating within very tight labor markets will be more proned to hold liquid assets. Future empirical
research may assert this relationship in detail.
Second, our theory predicts that those firms that hold more liquid assets should be more protected
to adverse shock hitting their lender. The recent empirical evidence, as well as the facts and regressions
reported in section 2, suggest that more leveraged firms dismissed more workers during the Great
Recession. In our baseline model, the firm borrows P˜ given by (11). The value of the firm is the
entrepreneurs investment F + Y0. The leverage ratio can be defined as loans divided by total assets,
and is given by
LE =
P˜
P˜ +K + Y0
(22)
where P˜ +K + Y0 is total assets. Since P˜ is increasing in A, the leverage ratio will tend to be higher
for firms that do not hold liquid assets than for firms that do. Furthermore, firms with τ < τ∗ should
be less leveraged than firms with τ > τ∗. Our model predicts that there is more firing in the no-liquid
assets equilibrium during the crisis, and firms with no liquid assets fire more than firms with cash.
This is consistent with our motivating facts.
Third, our results on wage bargaining indicate that empowerment of workers may have conse-
quences for the financial decisions of firms. First, our model indicates that empowerment of workers
may ease the financial constraints of the firm, as it will act as a commitment device, and allowing the
firm to borrow from their workers’ future earnings (earned after the shock). Furthermore, provided
that a financial shock is sufficiently likely, it also changes the trade-off between liquid assets and size
in the direction of liquid assets.
Fourth, our theory predicts that firms embedded into better functioning financial sectors should
be, on average, more leveraged and less inclined to hold cash. In addition, the theory predicts that
a more financially integrated system should dismiss more labor under adverse financial conditions.
We believe that the dynamics of the US labor market in the early 2007, when compared to the
European experience in the aftermath of the financial shock, is quite revealing in this respect. The
US corporate sector is arguably more financially integrated than the European one (Rajan Zingales,
1998). When the financial shock hit in 2007, the US unemployment rose quickly from 5 to 9 percent,
while European unemployment rose only modestly. It is certainly true that labor market institutions
in Europe reduced labor shedding, but the dramatic rise in US unemployment is likely to have been
the counterpart of its finance orientation. The evidence reported in Boeri Garibaldi and Moen (2013)
is coherent with this interpretation.
Admittedly, there is a caveat to the last argument. Although recent micro evidence assembled
for the US (Chodorow-Reich, 2014) clearly suggests that the health conditions of the lender had
a significant impact on the firm propensity to reduce employment during the financial crisis, this
evidence is silent on the role of liquid assets. Indeed, the large firms in the US corporate sector
became a net lender at the beginning of the 2000s. Armenter Hnatkovska (2012) show that in a
sample of 6000 listed firms in Compustat, 44 percent had positive net financial assets in 2007, at
the outset of the financial crisis.21 How is it possible to reconcile the importance of cash holdings
in the US with the large employment losses observed in 2007 and linked to the lender health by the
Chodorow-Reich (2014) findings? We argue that this does not count against our model, for several
20Opler et al. (1999) argue that in general there are precautionary and transaction motives for the firms holding cash.
First, the firm saves transaction costs to raise funds and does not have to liquidate assets to make payments. Second, the
firm can use the liquid asset to finance its day to day activities if other sources of funding are not available. Armenter
and Hnatkovska (2012) argue that firms accumulate cash holdings in order to avoid being financially constrained in the
future. In their paper firms operate within a perfect labor market and must resort to costly equity every now and then.
It turns out that the value function is strictly concave even if their utility is linear.
21Kararbounis and Meinman, 2012 link changes increase in corporate savings to changes in labor income shares
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reasons. First, our model is best suited to describe small, privately held firms, while the liquid assets
observed were held mainly by large listed (often multinational) firms. Huasheng et al. (2012) clearly
show that private firms hold less than half as much cash as public firms do. In addition, they also
report evidence that the private firms adjust more slowly to their desired liquid assets. Lastly, the
listed firms in Compustat held liquid funds in 2007 according to the accounting classification, but
such liquid funds were not necessarily so liquid. They may indeed have been very illiquid, particularly
when the crisis hit.
7 Final remarks
Interaction between labor and finance is a growing field, as shown by the literature briefly reviewed
in this paper. We contribute to this field by integrating the traditional DMP model with the limited
pledgeabilty friction developed by Holmostrom and Tirole. The result is a tractable micro-founded
model of labor-finance interactions that generates a demand for liquid assets inside the firm. The
model yields a number of testable implications. The most relevant in the context of the Great Re-
cession is that highly leveraged firms should experience larger employment losses during a financial
crisis. Consistently with previous studies, based on micro data on employment adjustment and bal-
ance sheets, we find that highly leveraged firms and sectors are indeed characterized by higher job
destruction rates during financial recessions.
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Theoretical annex
Derivation of optimal search equations
The constraint implicitly defines an indifference curve θ = θ(R,U) where U is the given value of
unemployment. Further
dθ
dR
= − θq(θ)
q(1− β)R
where β is the absolute value of the elasticity of q(θ), independent of θ under a Cobb-Douglas speci-
fication of the matching function. Total search costs define implicitly an isocost and the equilibrium
is going to be a tangency condition between the isocost C and the indifference curve U .
Formally, the first order condition for a minimum- once we use the indifference curve - is thus
γq′(θ)
q2
θq(θ)
q(1− β)R = 1
or
R =
γ
q
β
1− β
Total hiring cost is thus
C =
γ
q
1
1− β
Over and beyond the rent, the firm pays the worker a flow value rU per period employed. Finally, θ
is given by
θq(θ) =
rU − z
R
= (rU − z)1− β
β
q
γ
hence
θ(U) =
rU − z
γ
1− β
β
(23)
Worker flows and stocks
To complete the specification of the economy we have to account for the aggregate labor flows. In
the economy there is a measure 1 of workers who can be employed in new firms or firms that already
experienced the first λ shock. We label respectively n1 and n2 the share of workers employed in
the two types of firms. In the war chest equilibrium, conditional on a λ shock firms do not fire any
worker and continue with their cash holdings. Let ω be an indicator function that takes value 1 if the
economy is in a no-cash equilibrium. The general balance flow conditions read
θq(θ)u = ωλn2 + (1− ω)(λτn1 + λ)n2
ωλn1 + (1− ω)(λ(1− τ))n1 = λn2
u+ n1 + n2 = 1
The first equation is simply the outflows from unemployment and inflows into unemployment, where
the latter involves also the share of workers in type 1 firms that do not find refinancing in the NoLA
equilibrium. The second condition is the flow into n2 from type 1 firms and outflows out of n2. Again,
in the NoLA equilibrium only the surviving employed enter the type 2 state. The last condition is
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the aggregate labor market condition. Solving for the stock yields
u = ω
λ
λ+ 2θq(θ)
+ (1− ω) λ
λ+ (1 + (1− τ))θq(θ)
n1 = ω
θq(θ)
λ+ 2θq(θ)
+ (1− ω) θq(θ)
λ+ (1 + (1− τ))θq(θ) (24)
n2 = ω
θq(θ)
λ+ 2θq(θ)
+ (1− ω) θq(θ)(1− τ
λ+ (1 + (1− τ))θq(θ)
Proof of proposition 3
Proof: It is straightforward to show that U∗ is decreasing in γ. It follows that an increase in γ increases
the right-hand side of (19), and hence makes liquidity more favorable. Furthermore, in the limit, as
γ → 0, one can easily show that C → 0, θ → 0 and R → 0. The labor market is competitive with a
wage w = rU < y.22 Equation (17) then reads
(1 + λ˜(1− τ)) ≤ τ
k
where k = 1
1− y−w−xr+λ
> 1. As the left-hand-side is strictly greater than one, while the right-hand-side
is strictly less than one, the result follows.
An increase in y increases y − rU . Suppose not. Then it follows from (9) that profits per worker
fall strictly, and from (15) that the financial constraint tightens. Hence profits fall, a contradiction.
It follows that y − rU decreases, and hence that holding liquid assets is more likely. An increase in τ
reduces V A while it does not influence V I . An increase in τ therefore makes cash more likely. Finally,
an increase in x increases U∗, and hence reduces the left-hand-side of (19).
Proof related to general equilibrium with bargaining
Taking derivatives of (21) with respect to U∗ gives
∂2V (I;U∗)
∂I∂U∗ =
∂λˆ
∂U∗
[
F
Y0
+ τ(
y − rU∗
r + λ
− 1) + λˆ ∂
∂U∗
F
Y0
+ τ(
y − rU∗
r + λ
− 1)
= λˆ
∂
∂U∗
[
F
Y0
+ τ(
y − rU∗
r + λ
− 1)
]
(25)
Since ∂V (I;U
∗)
∂I = 0 initially. Hence changes in the parameters γ, y, τ and x shifts the rhs of (19) and
(25) in the same direction, hence proposition 3 still holds.
Statistical annex
Figure 2 plots the distribution of employment changes across firms in the EFIGE survey, using also a
Kernel density estimator (blue line) to characterise the distribution. As data refer to a global recession
year, most firms appear to be downsizing: the median is 0, the mean is -6. In addition to the mode at
0, there are also some spikes at -10, -20 and -30. This may indicate that respondents answered doing
some rounding. Some of our estimates below take into account of such heaping problems.
Table 2 provides some descriptive statistics on the measures of leverage which are used in the
empirical analysis in 2007, the year before the beginning of the Great Recession. In particular, the
22Even in the limit, firms don’t grow infinitely due to the borrowing constraint, hence wages must be below produc-
tivity in order for the firms to capitalize on K.
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Figure 2: Firm-level net employment change, Distribution of firms
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Gearing ratio is the debt to equity ratio measuring the extent to which the firm is using creditor’s
vs. owner’s funds. As shown by table 2, there is significant cross-country and within country (across
sectors) variation in these measures. At the same time, there are large differences in the average size
of firms across countries, which confirms that data are not cross-country comparable.
Table 3 reports OLS and IV regressions limited to either firms downsizing or expanding employment
levels. In the 2SLS estimates the instrumented gearing ratio is significant only in the case downsizing
firms.
The effects of leverage survive when we put on the left-hand-side a categorical variable (0 for
downsizing, 1 for firms keeping the same employment level, 2 for those upsizing) in order to cope with
the heaping problems mentioned above.
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Table 2: Measures of Leverage, Descriptive Statistics
Country Number of Firms Revenues growth 2008-2009 Size of Firms (Employees 2007)
Average Standard Average Standard
Deviation Deviation
AUT 443 63.5% 0.740 100 33
FRA 2,973 -8.3% 0.010 50 8
GER 2,935 -5.2% 0.008 96 11
HUN 488 -12.4% 0.015 68 9
ITA 3,021 -18.6% 0.005 40 2
SPA 2,832 -16.8% 0.015 45 3
UK 2,067 0.1% 0.032 20 773
Variable Average Min Max Standard
Deviation
Gearing Ratio (2007) 1.20 0.00 997.53 175.46
∆e -6.18 -100 100 15.16
∆y¯ -0.09 -0.30 5.64 0.39
Size of Firms (2007) 116.65 0.00 365,630 3,595.00
Third Party Collateral 0.04 0 1 0.21
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Table 3: Regression on downsizing and expandind firms
Sample: Only Firms Downsizing
(3) (4)
VARIABLES ∆e(%) Employment Growth ∆e(%) Employment Growth
Method OLS IV
Second stage
Gearing a -0.003** -0.034*
(0.001) (0.017)
∆y¯ b 0.547 95.87
(1.243) (132.8)
First stage
Gearing
Third party collateral 88.366***
(21.310)
Observations 4151 1195
Sample: Only Firms Upsizing
(5) (6)
VARIABLES ∆e(%) Employment Growth ∆e(%) Employment Growth
Method OLS IV
Second stage
Gearing a -0.0041* 0.0354
(0.0023) (0.171)
∆y¯ b -0.0915 33.53
(3.048) (679.9)
First stage
Third party collateral 31.11***
Observations 1060 307
All regressions include a constant and dummies for , Country, Sector, Size
and Country*Sector
a Gearing Ratio is the debt to equity ratio
b Change in output at the sectoral level
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 4: All Firms
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES ∆e(%) ∆e(%) ∆e(%) ∆e(%) ∆e(%) ∆e(%)
Method OLS OLS IV IV IV IV
Second stage
∆y¯ 1.107 1.049 -57.31 98.56 -95.87 -33.53
(0.910) (0.901) (133.3) (169.1) (132.8) (679.9)
Gearing -0.004*** -0.029** -0.34* 0.0354
(0.001) (0.012) (0.017) (0.171)
Solvency 0.04*** 0.603***
(0.006) (0.213)
Constant -8.123*** -10.73*** -13.09 -13.19 -24.75 0.976
(2.594) (2.630) (17.11) (20.69) (16.62) (106.2)
ountry YES YES YES YES YES YES
Sector YES YES YES YES YES YES
Country*Sector YES YES YES YES YES YES
Size YES YES YES YES YES YES
First stage
Gearing Solvency Gearing Gearing
Third party collateral 108.24*** -6.846*** 88.366*** 31.11***
(16.476) (1.686) (21.310) (68.121)
Observations 8596 9649 2358 2900 1195 307
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 5: All firms (∆e categorical)
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES ∆e(%) ∆e(%) ∆e(%)
∆y¯ -0.0157 -0.0165 -0.0201
(0.0420) (0.0411) (0.0426)
Gearing -0.000160***
(3.95e-05)
Solvency 0.00104***
(0.000293)
Constant 0.589*** 0.522*** 0.541***
(0.120) (0.120) (0.119)
Country YES YES YES
Sector YES YES YES
Country*Sector YES YES YES
Size YES YES YES
Observations 8,693 9,757 8,161
R-squared 0.078 0.076 0.072
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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